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ABSTRACT 
Defense reform in Hungary has followed a difficult path from the Soviet era to 
NATO accession. This paper suggests how Hungary first adopted the new Defense Law 
and Basic Security Principles in 1993, and defined the roles of the Armed Forces in the 
new post-Cold War era. Secondly, by the end of the NATO accession talks in 1998, 
Hungary transformed not only its own military to comply with NATO standards, but also 
the command structure and the leadership and management of the Armed Forces. As a 
consequence of the 1999 Kosovo War the Hungarian government initiated a new, three- 
phase defense reform concept. The new defense reform sets forth a smaller, better- 
equipped, sustainable army, capable of carrying out missions, originated in the 1998 
Defense Law, the 1998 Basic Security Principles, and international obligations. Due to a 
broad parliamentary and public consensus and a ten-year process, from 1990 to 2000, 
Hungary has radically transformed its civil-military relation and established the basis of a 
Western democratic principle-based, civilian-controlled Armed Forces. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Civil-military relations in Hungary have changed radically in the last decade. The 
October 1989 Constitution and the 1 December 1989 Defense Reform Concept provided 
a basic legal framework for reforming civil-military relations. The December 1993 
Defense Act made the armed forces directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, 
which has administrative responsibilities over the armed forces, and at the same time this 
law strengthened the constitutional position of the President, as Commander-in-Chief. 
However, the Parliament, particularly, the Parliamentary Defense Committee 
could have been more effective, playing a decisive role in defense matters. The 
Legislative branch defines the priorities of defense policy, defense budget, the manning 
level of the armed forces, the balance between services and the main direction for the 
development of military technology. 
The 1993/CX1 Defense Act and the 61/2000 National Assembly Resolution define 
a long-term defense reform, which includes the steps of restructuring the armed forces, 
simplification of the command and control strata, modernization of training and military 
technology, and the improvement of work and living conditions of military personnel for 
the period of 2000-2010. 
The integrated Ministry of Defense eliminates those duplications caused by the 
conflicting tasks of both the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Staff. The Defense 
Minister's involvement in the direct command structure facilitates the flow of defense 
1
 Roman numbers refer to the sequential numbers of State's Law, approved by the Parliament in a 
given year. 
XV 
needs from the armed forces to the government, opening defense policy and activities to 
public scrutiny and accountability and providing more effective oversight of the 
Hungarian Defense Forces. 
With the existence of political and public support to sustain a capable army, the 
1999 Strategic Defense Review makes the Defense Forces capable of carrying out tasks 
set forth in the 1998 amended Defense Act, and meeting military obligations originated in 
international treaties, especially with North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nation 




The dilemma of the control of the armed forces is confronted not only by the 
established liberal democracies, but also this issue challenges the democratizing societies 
of Central and Eastern Europe. The ancient dilemma, "Set quis costudiet ipsos 
Custodes"1 has echoed over centuries; however, since the armed forces and society have 
entered the age of mass politics, total war and its aftermath, the nature of the problem has 
also changed to highlight the challenges of democratic statehood and security. 
The revolutions of 1989-90 in Central and Eastern Europe provided a number of 
challenges to European security. One of the immediate consequences of these challenges 
has been the aspiration of approximately 80 million Central Europeans (16.3 million East 
Germans, 37.8 million Poles, 15.7 million Czechs and Slovaks, and 10.6 million 
Hungarians) to "return to Europe."" Reflecting this popular will, the new Central 
European governments have adopted policies designed to join Western European 
political, economic, and military institutions; the European Union and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). It was additionally in the interest of Europe and the United 
States that this process be successful. The future complexion of these new states' 
governments and alliance orientations will also have a profound impact on the security of 
Central and Western Europe. European institutions are important to Central Europe 
1
 But who is to guard the guards themselves? Juvenal, Omnia Romae, vi. 347. 
On 25-26 January 1990, during his visit to Hungary and Poland, Czechoslovak's President Havel called 
on the three countries' cooperative effort to "return to Europe". 
2 
because they legitimize the programs of their political leaders to society. However, 
NATO 
is especially important because it anchors the United States to Europe and 
provides additional psychological security to these states, which have been 
so tossed about by history. NATO, with its trans-Atlantic ties, is seen not 
just as an Article 5 guarantee against aggression but as a stabilizing 
instrument that ensures continued statehood.3 
This thesis deals with civil-military reform, in the last ten years, in Hungary to 
comply with NATO practices, and highlights relevant institutions and societal conditions, 
which are essential and have been established to support the shared principles of civilian 
direction of the army in liberal democracies. Through the following issues, such as, 
• existence of a clear legal and constitutional framework, defining the basic 
relationship between the state and armed forces; 
• significant role of parliament in legislating on defense and security 
matters; 
• hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government through a 
civilian organ - ministry of defense - of public organization, which is 
charged with direction of the military's activity; 
• presence of a well trained and experienced professional military that is 
respected and funded by a civilian authority; 
• division of responsibility between civilian and uniformed defense 
authority in such way that political accountability and military 
professionalism to be maximized; 
• existence of developed civil society with practice and tradition of 
democratic institution and nationwide consensus on the role and mission 
of the military; 
• presence of strong non-governmental component within the defense 
community, capable of participating in public debate on defense and 
security policy; 
Simon, Jeffrey: NATO Enlargement & Central Europe (Institute For National Strategic Studies, NDU, 
1996), p. 5. 
4
 Joö. Rudolf: The Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Institute for Security Studies Western European 
Union, 1996), p. 6. Also see Simon, Jeffrey: NATO Enlargement & Central Europe (Institute For 
National Strategic Studies, NDU, 1996), pp. 26-27. 
this paper shows that Hungary has reformed its civil-military relations on a democratic 
basis reflecting not only on its NATO membership, but also on domestic politics, which 
in turn fits into the model of modern liberal democracies. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
The challenge to the US and Europe posed by the historic processes - liberation 
of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries from Soviet primacy, regaining 
national independence of those countries and, unfortunately, as a side effect, 
reinforcement of nationalistic movement in some CEE countries, - is not just to 
accommodate the aspiration of eighty million Central Europeans to re-establish liberal 
democratic rule and to rediscover their historic heritage, but is also to ensure that the 
revolutions succeed. This policy is necessary because Central European liberal 
democracies represent a model - a roadmap - to other Eastern and Southeast European 
nations and states such as Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and the successor states of 
Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics (USSR), who also seek a return 
to Europe. 
The Hungarian experience of step-by-step reconciliation of civil-military relations 
after a long period of the Soviet-type regime may help countries aspiring to NATO 
membership to avoid unnecessary domestic political struggle to establish civil control 
over the military. Hungary's lesson learned of establishing a civilian-controlled ministry 
of defense and army5, defining national security interests and problems6, funding a well- 
5
 "Az 1993. evi CX törveny a honvedelemröl," Magyar Közlönv No. 186, Budapest, 24 December, 1993, 
4.§- 
trained and equipped army capable of carrying out tasks, which are originated in national 
Defense Law and in commitment to Western Security organizations7, and the way of 
employing domestic political and public support for implementing the above-mentioned 
task, shows the way from Soviet-ideology dominated "internationalism" to clear national 
interest articulated in Western Security institutions. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used for this thesis is a case study of the evaluation of civil- 
military relation in Hungary, based on various phases of Hungarian history after 1989, 
and the use of scholarly and journalistic sources including primary and secondary 
sources.8 
6
 "Basic Principles of the Security Policy of the Republic of Hungary," European Security Vol 3, No. 2, 
(1994), pp. 352-358. See also "Basic Principles of Security Policy of the Republic of Hungary." 94/1998 
OGY Hatarozat. Budapest, 28 December 1998. 
7
 "Basic Principles of Security Policy of the Republic of Hungary," 94/1998 OGY Hatarozat. Budapest, 28 
December 1998. 
8
 See Bibliography. 
II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE COMMUNIST 
REGIME (1945-1989) 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Hungary was an isolated but influential linguistic and cultural island within the 
Habsburg Empire and managed to gain a semblance of autonomy from Habsburg rule 
after the 1867 Ausgleich (compromise), which created the Austro-Hungarian Dual 
Monarchy. 
The Hungarian Army reflected the societal condition of the entire Habsburg 
Empire. "An Army officer career depended on his social origin, the ability to purchase 
place in regiment and the goodwill of [a] regimental protegee. By the eve of the World 
War I noble birth advantage and purchase of position had been eliminated and ability and 
durability in service became key to success."9 Yet, representation of army officers in the 
Hungarian, national, Army and Joint Army showed that only an educated, mostly Roman 
Catholic elite got officers' promotion. Under-representation of nationalities (Serbs, 
Romanians, Ruthens) was explained by their other - Eastern - Confession and relatively 
small size of educated elites.10 
As successor to the Danubian Monarchy after World War I, "Principal Allied and 
Associated Powers" considered Hungary as one of the powers responsible for the war. 
9
 Deäk, Istvän: Beyond Nationalism A Societal and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps 1848- 
1918 (Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 167. 
10
 Deäk, Istvän: Beyond Nationalism A Societal and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps 1848- 
19J8_(Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 171, 185. 
After World Wax I, as a result of the unfair Treaty of Trianon, Hungary was reduced in 
size and population; the country lost 72 percent of its original territory and 64 percent of 
its population, including originally Slovak, Romanian and Serb-speaking nationalities. 
By the Trianon Treaty, Transylvania was given to Romania, Croatia-Slavonia to 
Yugoslavia, Banat to Romania and Yugoslavia, and Slovakia and Carpato-Ukraine to 
Czechoslovakia.11 
Hungary's efforts to develop democratic institutions in the interwar period also 
met a similar fate as the rest of Central Europe. The 1918 "Autumn Revolution" led by 
the then Prime Minister Mihäly Kärolyi, established a republic. Nonetheless, because of 
lack of public support and baseless promises of the new government, the republic was 
discarded by Bela Kun's proletarian revolution12 on March 21 1919. After the Hungarian 
"Red Army" invaded Czechoslovakia, Romania, - as a member of Entente (a military 
alliance, originated in 1892 between France and Russia, to which Romania joined on 17 
August 1916), - for helping the Czechs occupied the Hungarian capital, although, 
Czechoslovakia formally joined the "Small Entente" (a military alliance between 
Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Serb-Croat-Slovenian Kingdom) only in 1921. The 
Great Powers demanded the invaders, both Hungary and Romania, to evacuate the 
occupied territories, after which Hungary ended up in Admiral Miklös Horthy's 
dictatorship.13 
The Hungarian Army of the interwar period can be seen as a logical continuation 
of the prewar Army. The officer corps had strong German orientation, moreover, many 
11
 'Treaty of Peace Between The Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary", Part Ü, Article 27, available 
from www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwl/tril.html. 
12
 www.c3.hu/scripta/beszelo/98/l l/081979.htm. 
13
 Van den Doel, Theo: Central Europe: The New Allies? (Westview Press, 1994), p. 27. 
Hungarian officers were of German origin.14 Officers had been trained either at the 
Budapest Ludovica Academy or at the War College in Vienna.15 Pro-German orientation, 
however, in interwar period was based on Hungarian revisionism, rather than on inherited 
traditions.16 Prestige of the Army declined after 1918 due to different factors: the pay was 
poor, the Army reduced in size, a proportion of non-noble, non-gentry officers rose, and a 
large sector of officers' corps came to consists of national minorities. The general 
public's disbelief and distrust toward the Army, due to the loss of war and territories, 
amplified the loss of prestige.17 
During World War II Hungary participated on the side of the Axis powers in 
hopes of recovering the former Hungarian territories. As a reward for joining the Axis, 
Hungary received back Transylvania, part of Croatia and Serbia, and part of Upper 
Hungary (part of Slovakia). Yet, since Hungary, again, was on the side of the defeated, its 
Trianon-mandated borders remained unchanged by the second Paris Peace Treaty of 
1947 is jjjg xreaty also provided the Soviet Union with the possibility of stationing 
military units in the territory of Hungary to support Soviet troops in Austria. 
After World War II the Soviets decapitated the Hungarian Army. The Russians 
eliminated prewar officers from the Hungarian Army, because they viewed the Hungarian 
officer corps as pro-German oriented. Another reason why officers were eliminated was 
their class origin. Interwar and World War II Army leaders were members of Hungarian 
gentry families, such as Generals Lajos Veres, Bela Miklös Dälnoki, Gabor Faragö and 
14
 Ithiel de Sola Pool: Satellite Generals (Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 96. 
15
 Kiräly Bela, Walter Scott Dilalrd ed: War and Society in Eastern and Central Europe Vol. XXIV. 
(Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 150. 
16
 Ithiel de Sola Pool: Satellite Generals (Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 96. 
17
 Ibid: p. 115. 
18
 "Peace Treaty of Paris", Article 4, available from www.ifi.savba.sk/ext/smr/paris.html. 
others.19 After the war, in 1947 Hungary became a republic again, but the Communist 
takeover in 1949 terminated Hungary's newly acquired independence. 
The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 would have ceased the legitimacy of the 
presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. However, the foundation of the Warsaw Pact in 
1955, with the existence of Soviet troops20 on the Hungarian soil, did not give Hungary 
any choice but to become a member of the Warsaw Pact. The decision to enter the 
Warsaw Pact was also affected by the fact that the then Hungarian government was 
Soviet-oriented (Mätyäs Räkosi, a Soviet indoctrinated Communist was the Communist 
Party's leader, and Ernö Gero, another orthodox Communist was Prime Minister), and 
Hungarian Army's leadership was also Soviet-committed. Furthermore, the Army did not 
have "national independence", since in reality every Hungarian military unit was 
commanded by a Soviet "counselor".21 
Hungary's effort to revolt in 1956 was thwarted by Soviet invasion. In rejecting 
this form of Soviet indoctrination, during the Revolution, "the Hungarian Army either 
joined the revolutionists or remained intact"22, putting the reputation of the military high 
among the population. The repression of the revolution by the Soviet military resulted in 
an agreement between Hungary and the Soviet Union in May 1957. The agreement 
stipulated, "...Soviet military units would stay in Hungary for as long as the NATO 
Treaty remained in force." 
19
 Ithiel de Sola Pool: Satellite Generals (Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 98. 
20
 Untill 1995 20,000 Soviet troops were stationed in Hungary. After signing the Austrian State Treaty, 
Soviet troops were transferred from Austria to Hungary and composed of 80,000. See Barany, D. 
Zoltan: Soldier and Politics in Eastern Europe. 1945-90 (New York: St. Martin Press, 1993), pp. 58. 
21
 Barany, D. Zoltan: Soldier and Politics in Eastern Europe. 1945-90 (New York: St. Martin Press, 1993), 
pp. 47-48. 
22
 Kiräly Bela: Facts on Hungary (New York: 1957), p. 54. 
23
 Van den Doel, Theo: Central Europe: The New Allies? (Westview Press, 1994), p. 29. 
With its "velvet" revolution in 1989, Hungary, too, began its liberal democratic 
experiment for the third time this century dismantling the model of a Soviet civil-military 
system and the unhappy legacy of the 20th century. 
B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS UNDER COMMUNIST REGIME 
Communist Party leadership provided neither democratic nor civilian control of 
the armed forces. It did not exercise democratic control, because the Communist Party's 
institutions and mechanisms lacked the basic principles of democratic control and 
accountability. The leading Party's organs were not democratically elected; the system 
was based on the cooption from the top. 
In such conditions, the parliament, as the highest political organ, was only a 
facade. The whole political environment "lacked transparency, political responsibility 
and accountability."24 Like society, "the armed forces' institutions were dominated by 
one-party authority that had no legitimacy or democratic mandate in the eyes of the 
overwhelming majority of the public."25 
In the 1980s, in the period of the "melting" of the Communist regime, Hungary 
moved from the totalitarian model to, at least, a limited open society. However, despite 
societal changes, civil-military relations remained untouched and did not modify the 
nature of Communist Party control of the Army. It was "... because the armed forces, 
together with the police, were typical power institutions, pillars of the regime in many 
24
 Barany, D. Zoltan: Soldier and Politics in Eastern Europe. 1945-90 (New York: St. Martin Press, 1993), 
p. 90. 
25
 Joö, Rudolf: The Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Institute for Security Studies Western European 
Union, 1996), p. 12. 
respects."26 In the hands of political establishment the military was not only part of the 
system, but also the guardian of the system in domestic and international levels. 
According to A.A. Timorin, a Soviet military specialist, there are three internal functions 
of all socialist armies 
They act (1) as a psychological deterrent against anti-socialist forces; (2) 
as a reserve of manpower and equipment for the internal security forces; 
and (3) as a 'combat force in cases when the opposition of the enemies of 
socialism acquire significant scale, intensity, duration, and sharpness (a 
counter-revolutionary uprising, mutiny, banditry, the unleashing of civil 
war).27 
The Hungarian regime agreed with the Army's internal function. At the 1970 
Politburo meeting, "Jänos Kädär, [the then Secretary-General of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers' Party (HSWP)], asserted that it was the Hungarian People's Army's (HPA) task 
to defend the regime from internal opposition."28 The 1976 Defense Law articulated and 
amplified the same internal mission, "...cooperation in the protection of national security 
and domestic order; participation in the economy and in the education and training of 
youth; and rendering assistance at times of natural disasters." 
In addition to this, Communist Party control was not a genuine civilian control. 
In pluralistic democracy separable and separate players participate in the development of 
relations between society and the armed forces. This system reflects 
alternatives, opposing group references, values and demands. ... defense 
policy and institutional network that plans and executes that policy, is the 
product of the interplay of these powerful, conflicting interests. In such 
environment ... it is easy to delineate the aims and interest of various 
26
 Joö, Rudolf: The Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Institute for Security Studies Western European 
Union, 1996), p. 13. 
27
 A.A. Timorin: Socialno -politicheskaia priroda i naznachenie socialisticheskikh armii in eds Voina i 
armiia (Moscow: Voennizdat, 1977), p. 348. 
28
 Barany, D. Zoltan: Soldier and Politics in Eastern Europe. 1945-90 (New York: St. Martin Press, 1993), 
p. 90. 
29
 Zagoni, Erno, "A Magyar Nephadsereg helye a politikai rendszerben," Honvedsegi Szemle (Budapest, 
May 1987), p. 4. 
10 
actors: the legislature, the executive, the military leadership ... different 
political parties....30 
In a one-party system the opposite is true. In hierarchical structure, such as 
Communist Party structure, there are no clear dividing lines between institutions, 
although, it looks relatively simple. Additionally, the decision-making process is obscure, 
or hidden. In formulating of defense strategy or the military budget the real influence of 
civilian politicians is never clear. 
In Hungary, both the civilian government and military High Command were 
under strict control of a single party. They were subordinated to a single political power: 
the Communist Party. To deepen this subordination the Party sent political cadres to the 
military, and high-positioned military leaders were co-opted to Party leadership. There 
was no difference between the Party's leadership over the military and state leadership 
over the armed forces, since instead of real civilian control the military was under a kind 
of apparatus control. "The lack of distinct roles undermined not only the democratic 
standards, but also the armed forces, as a separate institution. It proved to be harmful to 
professional autonomy; it reinforced political opportunism and selection by ideological 
criteria."31 
Even though, the Party's control of the armed forces was neither democratic nor 
civilian, it proved to be very real and quite effective. The Party defined military doctrine, 
strategy and the main stream of the armed forces' development for a very practical 
reason: to use the powerful machinery for its purposes. 
30
 Joö, Rudolf: The Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Institute for Security Studies Western European 
Union, 1996), p. 13. 
31
 Ibid: p. 15. 
11 
Another reason why the Party exercised full control over the military was "... the 
Communist Party never trusted the professional military. The armed forces were 
considered an extremely significant group in terms of power, as they were both highly 
organized and possessed weapons. Consequently, they were perceived by some as 
potential rivals to the Party."32 Despite the fact that there was no tendency in the military 
towards coups, a robust apparatus was built up to prevent this and maintain unconditional 
loyalty to the Party. Different ways were introduced to exercise oversightr(a) monitoring 
the- armed forces through party organs; (b) controlling subordinating units by Main 
Political Department; (c) checking the armed forces using secret police. 
One of the main ways of politicizing the armed forces was by the introduction of 
Party structure into military units. Party cells were established in every unit from top to 
bottom. Ideological indoctrination was provided by permanent and compulsory political 
education among draftees and commissioned personnel. For career purposes, especially 
in higher ranks, party membership was more important, than professional capability. 
"Around 90 percent of the officers were members of the HSWP and 10 percent of the 
Communist Youth League (CYL)."33 
Another line of Party influence was the Main Political Department (MPD). "The 
MPD was a legacy of the commissar system originally developed by Trotsky's 
revolutionary Red Army in 1918-19, to ensure the loyalty of military officers charged 
with operational command task."34 MPDs were introduced at various levels of the 
military, but were linked, at the same time, to the Party's leading organs. They were 
32
 Joö, Rudolf: The Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Institute for Security Studies Western European 
Union, 1996), p. 15. 
33
 Barany, D. Zoltan: Soldier and Politics in Eastern Europe. 1945-90 (New York: St. Martin Press, 1993), 
p. 95. 
34
 R. Craig: Black Earth. Red Star A history of Soviet Security Policy (London: Ithaca, 1992), pp.18-19. 
12 
involved in every policy matter and could overrule the commander's decision. 
"Professional military personnel considered the activity of political officers useless, 
diverting time and energy from real duty, or simply violating [of] professional 
authority."35 Some observers even noted, "...had it been abolished from one day to the 
next, no one would have noticed."36 
Besides their domestic tasks both the Party cells in the army and the MPD had an 
international ideological function: deepen proletarian internationalism among the armies 
of the Warsaw Treaty Organization's (WTO). Generally, "...internationalism meant 
subordination of national interest to geopolitical consideration, which curtailed to a 
minimum national autonomy in defense planning and military thinking."37 
The third apparatus, built into the military unit was the military counter- 
intelligence. The name is misleading, since the task of such an organization was mainly 
to monitor Party loyalty and combat "internal enemy" the "anti-socialist forces" within 
the armed forces. Such a kind of "military intelligence" was an alien body within the 
Army because it was subordinated to the Ministry of Interior, not to the Ministry of 
Defense, and, furthermore, its personnel, in most cases, were out of the chain of 
command in the military units. 
35
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C. SOCIETAL CONDITIONS 
Like   other   Hungarian   governmental   institutions,   the   Hungarian   military 
leadership was not held in high esteem among population due to widespread corruption, 
mismanagement and allegedly a lack of professionalism. Conversely though, military 
educational facilities were rather popular among young men. After the foundation of 
military boarding schools in 1974, military services attracted a substantial number of 
youth from age 14-18 to these schools. Due to "free accommodation, clothing and 
allowance, board schools had no recruitment problems."38 Graduates from board schools 
were automatically accepted to higher military educational institutions. Individuals of 
worker and peasant background made up the majority in the military colleges. Such a 
"high percentage of working class student was partially by design, since military colleges 
- concerned with potential problems of political reliability - preferred them to those with 
roots in the intelligentsia."39 Another reason for the lower rate of youngster from 
intelligentsia is they considered a military career an appalling career choice. 
The low prestige rate of the military was perhaps the most important reason for 
the recruitment problem. Moreover, during the late 70s and early 80s, a military career 
lost its financial attractiveness. "Contrary to popular belief, the remuneration of the 
military profession had been surpassed by that of many other occupational strata".40 On 
the positive side, the military profession maintained some of its advantages. Retirement 
age was set at 55 years of age, lower than in any other occupational group. The pay of 
38
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young officers was relatively good, "especially when compared with other newly 
graduated professionals."41 Moreover, no one had to fear unemployment in the military. 
Given the emerging trend to "acceptable levels of unemployment", job security became 
an attractive part of a military career. 
41
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IE.    FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS (1989-1994) 
Political and social changes in the late 1980s in Hungary forced the incumbent 
government to begin the reform of civil-military relations. Security changes and 
challenges made the winner of the 1990 multi-party election continue this reform. The 
first part of this chapter examines the legacy of the last Communist government from the 
period of 1989-1990. The second part deals with the foundation of a legal framework for 
democratic civilian control over the military and with the first step of defense reform in 
creating smaller, but better equipped forces capable of protecting the country and 
carrying out new missions.42 
A. LEGACY OF THE LAST COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT 
There were incremental political and economical changes during 1980-1989 in 
Hungary. For example, the possibility of taking part in "second economy" improved 
living standard for many Hungarians. The previously strict travel- limitations were eased; 
Hungarians could travel to the West, which further amplified the population's desire for 
substantial changes in Hungary. Authorities, even if they did not approve it, more and 
more tolerated appearance of autonomous civil circles, which became a source of new 
42
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parties.43 Although these changes affected almost all aspect of the old system, the 
political control of the armed forces remained untouched by the rulers of the country. The 
government of 1989 announced its intention for defense reform; nevertheless, most of 
these remained only on paper. 
In July 1989 the then Prime Minister Miklös Nemeth noted, "...the new national 
defense policy needed to make clear that Hungary's national armed forces were in the 
hand of democratic power under appropriate and strict control." However, when he was 
asked who was the Commander-in-Chief, he answered, "It is not possible at present to 
give an unequivocal reply to this."44 The Prime Minister might have thought of 
"appropriate and strict control" as a control exercised by the Communist-reformer 
Commander-in-Chief, Imre Pozsgai, who had been expected to become President, 
according to the 1989 Defense reform. 
First, in accordance with the "[eight-plus-one-member] round-table discussion"4 
of spring 1989, MPD was abolished in the Hungarian Army. In line with this decision, all 
political activities were banned within the boundaries of military facilities so military 
personnel were not allowed to take part in political activities. The majority of 
professional soldiers, then, welcomed "trie end of ideology and the opportunity to 
concentrate on military rather than political matters."4 
43
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Second, during 1989, the Ministry of Justice drafted a new Constitution, based on 
principles articulated at round-table talks, to replace the old 1947 Communist one. The 
Parliament, which was still dominated by members of the Communist Party, passed the 
new Constitution in October 1989. According to new the Constitution "the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Armed Forces is the President, who is elected for [a] five-year term."47 
"Only Parliament is entitled to make [a] decision concerning the use of the Armed 
Forces."48 According to Article 19 of the Constitution, the National Assembly has the 
power to declare the state of war and conclusion of peace. In the event of war it sets up 
Defense Council for coordinating defense efforts. During peace-time, the prime minister, 
elected by majority of the National Assembly and the ministers of the government 
"control the operation of the armed forces, the police and other organs of policing."49 
The initiated defense reform divided the defense ministry into two separate parts. 
A relatively small staff of 135 in the defense ministry was subordinate to the prime 
minister, and the Headquarter of the Hungarian Army (HA) was subordinate to the 
President (see Appendix III.A.l).50 In the new system the Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
was responsible for military policy, planning and other administrative and theoretical 
matters, while the Headquarter of the HA was charged with task of supervising actual 
military training, development, exercises and the like. 
According to some observers, however, this division of entities was a clear 
intention of the government to remove the armed forces from the direct influence of the 
next, probable, non-communist government, which was expected to come to power in the 
47
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1990 multiparty elections. This allegation, nonetheless, did not contain proof, since the 
core of the army cadres have been loyal to the state and the Constitution, not to a single 
party. Even during the communist regime the "...basis of the armed forces [was] the 
defense of the Hungarian People's Republic [that is, the state and not the party]".51 
Moreover, in June 1989 the National Assemble approved the text of the new military oath 
that obliged soldiers (including civil servants and policemen) to serve the Republic of 
Hungary and its Constitution. 
In November 1989 "the new oath was signed by 99 percent of the professional 
corps"52 So, concerns were not about loyalty of the officer corps, but about the line of 
authority. In most parliamentary systems a clear line exists from prime minister through 
minister of defense to chief of staff. Contrary to this, in the 1989 defense reform of 
Hungary, "authority went directly from the President to the Commander of the Hungarian 
Army, leaving out the government of the chain of command, which [after the multiparty 
election] resulted in increased tension between the president and the civilian government 
[the president and the prime minister came from different parties]."53 
The political transformation, accompanying the power struggle affected military 
personnel and life as well. "By February 1990 more than 50 generals and 400 colonels 
were retired and the average age of professional soldiers dropped to 35 years."54 In the 
first half of the 1990, a reported 1700 officers left the service, for better opportunities in 
civilian life. 
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Since the Army's internal function was altered by the 1990 Defense Law, the 
officers' training reflected these changes too. In 1989-90 academic year, ideological 
training was replaced with courses on military and security policy, international law and 
military history. The structure of the military education was also reorganized. Since the 
1987 officer's training reform, which reduced the training period to three years, proved to 
be unsuccessful, military leadership reintroduced a four-year education program with 
higher admission criteria. The MOD wanted to attract the best of young men, but since 
the prestige of a military career was at an all-time low, primarily due to the low income 
of professional soldiers, the qualification of attendees remained at the previous low rate. 
Another factor contributing to the low prestige of the profession was "...the 
armed forces - more precisely, the military leadership - has long been perceived by the 
population as the refuge of the incompetent and corrupt. Moreover, for decades the 
Hungarians had viewed the military not as [a] guarantor of the nation's security but as a 
representative of foreign interest."55 It is possible that the nationalization of the military 
may change the mind of youths about a military career. Although the MOD wanted to 
increase salaries and benefits, the government's unwillingness, due to economic 
difficulties prevented such a measure. As a result "approximately 10 percent of active 
officers live under the official poverty line."5 
In contrast, service conditions for enlisted personnel improved in the same period. 
In 1989 the military leadership introduced a "monthly reception day", when conscripts 
could avoid the usual chain of command and seek remedy for their complaints. Since 
political-ideological education was abolished, enlisted personnel could spend their free 
55
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time as they saw fit. The modified Defense Law allowed conscientious objectors to serve 
in the Army without weapons, while such an objection until 1989 was subject to prison 
sentence. The mandatory military service was eased as well. The length of service was 
reduced from 18 to 12 months in 1990. "These were important measures not only because 
they made conscript life easier, but also because they signaled changes in the military 
establishment's attitude toward the civilian population."57 
The main purpose of the initiated reform was to render the armed forces 
accountable to the Hungarian government. It is noteworthy that this reform was initiated 
by the Communist government and demonstrated significant changes in civil-military 
relations. While the military was previously subordinated to the Party, the 1989 measures 
provided that the government, and ultimately the President would control the armed 
forces. The reform broke the 40-year practice of the Communist direct control of the 
armed forces. 
B.   DEEPENING   REFORM  OF   CIVIL-MILITARY  RELATION  AND   THE 
ARMED FORCES 
In the 1990 multiparty election a coalition government, composed of the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP), 
entered into power. The coalition parties and the opposition agreed on amendments to the 
new Constitution, regulating the use of force. On 19 June 1990 the National Assembly 
amended the Constitution, which stipulates, "...now [it] specially required a two-thirds 
57
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[rather than simple] majority of the National Assembly to employ forces, thereby 
CO 
ensuring parliamentary control over them."    The governing party, on 23 May 1990, 
appointed Lajos Für (MDF), as the first civilian Minister of Defense, after four decades 
of Communist rule.59 Mr. Für inherited a Communist-implemented Ministry of Defense, 
which dealt with social and political questions. He expressed concern about his authority, 
since the Headquarter of the Hungarian Army was separated from the ministry remaining 
beyond the minister's reach. Concerned with question of authority and, ultimately, the 
control of the armed forces, Defense Minister Für, argued that since Hungary was a 
Parliamentary Democracy, in which the government was responsible to the Parliament to 
implement overall policy, including defense, it could not be responsible for implementing 
defense policy, if it did not possess the tools necessary to control the armed forces. 
President Göncz argued that his authority was based on the responsibility as a Supreme 
Commander, who had a critical role in national defense. Kir&y Bela, a former general 
during the 1956 Hungarian uprising, was rehabilitated and a member of the Parliament 
Defense Committee argued, 
...the President is clearly the commander-in-chief but the Constitution 
places two restriction on his command. First, it authorizes the National 
Assembly to decide on deploying armed forces within Hungary or abroad. 
Secondly, it requires the prime minister's countersignature regarding 
every action involving national defense. ...no constitutional changes were 
required, the position of Commander of the Hungarian Army should be 
abolished, its responsibility should be transferred to the Chief of Staff, and 
the Chief of Staff should be, unconditionally, subordinated to the defense 
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The above-mentioned quotation is noteworthy, because it shows the long process 
of transformation: from 1991 to present the problem has not yet been resolved.61 Since 
the first multiparty election, each administration has had the ambition to transform the 
Ministry of Defense in line with the model of the Western countries and to reintegrate the 
Defense Staff into the Ministry. 
The transformation of the Ministry meant the reinforcement of the civilian- 
administrative component of the MOD. This reform sought a "Ministry of Defense, 
headed by a civilian politician that implements the decision of the Government with 
respect to the armed forces through the specific military activities of the (reincorporated) 
Chief of Defense Staff." However, implementation of such a kind of transformation 
encountered difficulties both on the civilian and military side. 
Firstly, there was virtually no civilian security and military expertise, neither 
among former opposition nor among ex-communists on defense and security matters, 
because these issues were previously out of public debate. Secondly, there were explicit 
anti-military feelings among the population, which were projected to influential 
governmental position. Viktor Orbän, the then opposition leader and now Prime Minister, 
even expressed opinion on disembodiment of the total Hungarian Army. He thought 
Hungary should solely rely on security guaranties of Western security organizations. 
Thirdly, the new political elite have not always understood the meaning of civilian 
control and political neutrality of the armed forces, therefore they were trying to 
eliminate the Communist ideology from the military, by sometimes using propaganda of 
61
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democratic liberal views, which was perceived by numbers of officers as a new 
indoctrination. The military, also, had no experience working with civilian politicians in 
the MOD or Parliament. Furthermore, since the military was in relative isolation in 
society, it had difficulties adapting to the new condition of democracy and market 
economy. 
The market economy and the budgetary constrains worked against the smooth 
development of civil-military relations. In transitional democracies the declining Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) aggravated the tensions inherited in civil-military relations (see 
Fig. III.B.l.) 63 
Real  GDP Growth in Percentages   in 
Hungary, 1989-1993 
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The falling GDP caused a decline as well in the defense budget (see Fig. III.B.2.). 64 
Decline in Percentages of 
Hungary's Defense Budget, 
1989-1993 
1990 1991 1992 1993' 
Figure III.B.2. 
Examining Fig. III.B.l, and Fig. III.B.2, it is notable that despite the growing rate 
of the GDP, defense budget continued to decline in the same period of time. This 
compounded the military's sense of being relegated to a minimum subsistence level and 
ultimately enhanced their dissatisfaction with the initiated defense reform. 
Realizing problems of authority, cooperation and defense spending as serious 
civil-military issues, the government and the President initiated a new defense reform at 
the end of 1991. The new defense reform responded to the 1991 Constitutional Court 
decision regarding the role of the President65, and expedited personal changes in the 
defense ministry (see Appendix HLB.l.) 66 
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Alongside the defense reform, which included not only changes in the MOD, but 
also structural changes in the Hungarian Army, the Parliament began to work on 
Hungary's new Defense Concept and Security Policy Concept. Some may argue that such 
important documents should have been approved by the Parliament prior to implementing 
the defense reform. This allegation may well be true and caused, seemingly, some 
inappropriate steps in the defense reform. 
Elaboration of new the Defense Concept and Security Policy Concept was a result 
of the "security vacuum", caused by Hungary's withdrawal from the WTO, withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Hungary, and new security challenges in the vicinity of Hungary. 
On 26 June 1990 the Hungarian Parliament voted overwhelmingly (232 for, 0 
against and 4 abstentions) for full withdrawal from the WTO.68 Along with this, as agreed 
upon at the Hungarian and Soviet foreign and defense ministers' meeting in March in 
Moscow,69 the Soviet troops fully withdrew from Hungary by June 1991. In such a 
situation Hungary faced security risks, different from those encountered earlier. 
Externally Hungary could face both non-military and military risks. First category of risk 
would have two appearances, 
1. A disastrous effect on the environment. This risk is posed by numerous 
nuclear reactors in Central and Eastern Europe, which were in serious 
disrepair. Besides immense environmental damage, another Chernobyl 
would have increased feelings of vulnerability. 
2. A great influx of refugees from the conflict area of the former Soviet 
Union or the Balkans. The young Hungarian democracy, facing 
economic difficulties, would be unable to deal with this influx, which 
may result in social tension and chaos.70 
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On the other hand, military risks may arouse from initially small-scale conflict 
(ethnic, territorial, religious, nationalistic) in any neighboring country of Hungary, which 
may escalate and spread to the territory of Hungary, if action is not taken in time. 
Internally, as a consequence of regional instability, Slovaks (120,000), Croats 
(80,000), Serbs (5,000), and Romanians (25,000) living within the Hungarian borders 
might have posed a problem to Hungary's internal stability.71 The most acute problems, 
Hungary faced, were issues of tension with the Slovak Republic and Romania. The 
Slovakian Vladimir Meciar government using disagreement between Hungary and 
Slovakia, caused by the Bös-Gabchikovo-Nagymaros Danube-dam, severely restricted 
Hungarian minority rights (use of native language, education) in Slovakia.72 In Romania, 
although the government did not participate overtly in it, tension aroused in Transylvania, 
particularly in Cluj (Kolozsvär in Hungarian), due to a manifested anti-Hungarian attitude 
of the mayor of Cluj, Georghe Funar.73 Mr. Funar publicly opposed the reopening of the 
Hungarian General Consulate and the Bolyai University in Cluj. 
Hungary had the most relaxed relations, in terms of minorities, with Yugoslavia. 
Hungarians had the possibility to learn in their native tongue, perform in Hungarian 
theatre, and to publish Hungarian newspapers. The early 1990 influx of Vojvodinian 
refugees to Hungary was based on an overreaction to the Bosnian crisis, rather than 
actual abuse of minority rights. Yet, the ongoing crisis in Bosnia could have had impact 
71






on the Hungarian minorities in Vojvodina, had the tension spread to that Yugoslavian 
province.74 
To ease the probability of tension regarding minority rights in Hungary and in 
neighboring countries, the Antal government concluded a so-called "Basic Treaty" with 
Ukraine,75 which contained provisions for mutual respect of minorities' right, respect of 
existing borders and cooperation on a mutually beneficial basis. 
The Hungarian Parliament, taking into account the changed security challenges, 
adopted "The Basic Principles of National Defense of the Republic of Hungary" 
(Defense Concept) in April 1993. The Defense Concept states that the Hungarian Armed 
Forces have exclusively defensive functions. The country has no preconceived idea of 
enemy: it does not expect a traditional large-scale attack from any direction; however, it 
cannot ignore on-going military conflicts in the region. 
The eventual escalation of these conflicts and their geographical spread pose a 
potential military threat, a new type of challenge to the country. Article 16 of the Defense 
Concept points out that, ultimately Hungary's security will be determined by membership 
77 in NATO and the European Union. The Preamble to the National Security Principles 
underlines Hungary's approach to security matters as primacy of diplomatic means. 
Defense Concept reflected an unusually large consensus among the six parties 
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of the document did not affect direct party interests and the basic policy options were 
general enough to be acceptable to each parliamentary party. 
This six-party consensus helped to formulate and adapt another important legal 
document by the Parliament, the New Defense Law (Defense Act) on 7 December 
1993. Although the Law was adapted quasi-unanimously, during the adaptation process 
approximately 400 amendments were proposed by individual members of the Parliament. 
The Act deals with clarification of civilian oversight of the armed forces during 
peace-time and emergency period, legal framework and the Code of Conduct for 
professional soldiers. According to the Defense Act Parliament plays a primary role in 
defining the priorities of defense policy.80 The National Assembly decides the defense 
budget, the manning level of the armed forces, the balance between services and the main 
direction for the development of military technology.81 The Act made the armed forces 
directly subordinate to the MOD, which has administrative responsibilities over the 
armed forces.82 At the same time, the Act strengthened the constitutional position of the 
President, as Commander-in-Chief, in the event of emergency.83 
Members of the opposition parties feared that, in case of emergency the 
government may extend power given by the concept of "partial mobilization", according 
to the Constitution 19.§(E), and that it could lead to a weakening of the parliamentary 
control. To eliminate this fear, the Defense Act stipulates, "in event of surprise air or 
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ground attack, immediate action has to be taken by the Cabinet, simultaneously keeping 
the Parliament and the President informed."84 
The role of the Parliament Defense Committee cannot be omitted. Since 1990 the 
Committee has became a real functioning institution, in contrast to the window-dressing 
organization existing under the same name during the Communist era. Given the power 
by the Defense Act, the Defense Committee has actively participated in defense budget 
decision, for controlling expenditures,85 and in the debate over personnel changes in the 
MOD and the Hungarian Army.86 
The new thinking of the national defense affected the very personnel of the 
Hungarian Army. While in 1989 the military was comprised of 155,000 men, its size 
became 100,000 men by 1992. Furthermore, in accordance with the basic principles of 
national defense, the previous westbound concentration of forces changed to a more 
balanced geographic distribution of military units in the territory of Hungary. 
This re-dislocation of military units caused two unforeseeable problems. First, 
because of "lacks of [proper] infrastructure and means, relocated units were anything, but 
combat-ready, which left Hungary in a vulnerable position."88 Second, the relocation 
amplified with force reduction caused social tension. Since professional soldiers possess 
quite unique skills, those, who dropped out of the military, could rarely find work in 
civilian life increasing the number of unemployed. 
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From the relocating units a substantial number of professional soldiers did not 
accept the new commission because of the fear of worsening living condition, possible 
unemployment of spouses and a possible decrease in the quality of education for children. 
Since the defense budget continuously declined between 1990 and 1993 (see. Fig. III.B.2) 
and because "approximately 91.2 percent of the defense budget went for the day-to-day 
expenses"89, the MOD did not have resources to help solve these problem. 
On 14 January 1994, the Government, according to the legal ground laid in the 
Defense Act, announced preparatory work for reintegration of the Defense Staff into the 
MOD90, but it was stopped in July 1994, when the change of administration occurred. 
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IV. ON THE WAY TO NATO (1994-1998) 
This chapter examines the period between the formation of the new government in 
Budapest in 1994 and the beginning of the formal accession talks in 1998. The chapter 
contains three parts. The first part deals with politically and economically motivated 
changes in the MOD and Defense Forces. The second part offers a brief analysis of 
financial constrains regarding force modernization. The third part focuses on how the 
government and the MOD gained political and popular support for NATO membership. 
A. STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE 
ARMED FORCES 
Since the newly-emerging democracies in Central and East Europe (CEE) 
declared their desire to "return to Europe"91, NATO has been discussing the issue of 
enlargement. The initial response by NATO at the July 1990 London Summit was to 
extend a "hand of friendship" and invite members of WTO to send liaison ambassadors to 
NATO.92 During 1991-1994, as the situation became more complex with the July 1991 
Soviet troops withdrawal from Hungary, the WTO disappearance and the Soviet troops 
withdrawal from Germany93, NATO responded by creating the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC) to open dialogue on security among Alliance members and 
On 25-26 January 1990, during his visit to Hungary and Poland, Czechoslovak's President Havel called 
on the three countries' cooperate effort to "return to Europe". See: Joö Rudolf: The Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces (Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, 1996), p. 48. 
"London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," NATO Information Service (Brussels: 
5-6 July, 1990), articles 7,8. 
The Western Group of Soviet Forces completed their withdrawal from Germany in September 1994. 
33 
the CEE94. At the Brussels NATO Summit of 10-11 January 1994 "Partnership for 
Peace"  (PfP) was initiated and NATO declared that it was committed to future 
enlargement.95 Establishing the PfP may be seen as a step comparable to the Marshall 
Plan of 1947. Alongside these institutions, the September 1995 "Study on NATO 
Enlargement" stipulated, among others, the following necessary conditions for countries 
wishing to join NATO: 
...effective democratic control of the military - to include defense 
management reforms in areas such as transparent defense planning, 
resource allocation budgeting, appropriate legislation, and parliamentary 
and public accountability; and ... some minimal degree of military 
capability and NATO interoperability.96 
Meanwhile, in Hungary, the second multiparty election resulted in victory of the 
97 Hungarian Socialist Party (HPS) that gained 54 percents of the seats in the Parliament. 
Although the HSP alone had a majority in the Parliament, it formed a coalition 
government with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), thus achieving solid two- 
third majority in the National Assembly, enabling them to govern with "free hand". The 
former governing coalition's member-parties, that are the MDF and FKGP, joined in an 
opposition position together with the FJDESZ. Gyula Horn, former foreign minister in the 
Communist era, became Prime Minister and appointed a retired Colonel, former 
spokesman for the MOD, György Keleti, as defense minister. 
94
 "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," NATO Press Communique. 8 November, 1991, pp. 4-5. 
95
 "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government issued by the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, 
Belgium," NATO Press Communique. 11 January, 1994, p. 4. 
96




Upon his arrival, Mr. Keleti began to replace personnel in the previously MDF 
no 
filled with high positions with his former colleagues from Hungarian Defense Forces. 
Mr. Keleti replaced civilian experts with career military personnel even on departmental 
level, which caused an outcry from the Parliament Defense Committee's chairman, Imre 
Mecs, expressing concern about "militarization" of the defense ministry", from 
opposition parties, and even from abroad, such as an assessment from Potomac 
Foundation: "Instead of having civilians run the Ministry of Defense ... the management 
of [the] Ministry passed into [the] hand[s] of the uniformed military and former 
Communist functionaries."100 
The new Minister of Defense also began the internal reorganization of the MOD, 
firstly, by cutting personnel, and secondly, by adding new departments, such as the 
NATO Department, and Integration Secretariat for issues dealing with in regard joining 
NATO, and the Department for Multilateral Cooperation (see Appendix IV.A.l).101 
Though the new Defense Law of 7 December 1993 stipulates that the MOD and 
the Headquarter of the Hungarian Army were to be merged, Mr. Keleti, in September 
1994, recommended to the Parliament Defense Committee not to implement this task. 
His proposal was accepted, since members of the governing parties were in majority in 
the Defense Committee. However, the decision of the MOD had to be revised, after a 
British MOD study team, which was asked by the administrative state secretary to do a 
98
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survey on parliamentary oversight of the MOD, had concluded its work.103 Nevertheless, 
the real integration of the Defense Staff would take years and be accomplished by 2002104 
at best. 
The above-mentioned problems of a separated Ministry of Defense and Defense 
Staff existed in each former WTO country. Until 1989-1990, Ministries of Defense dealt 
mostly with social-political matters, while Defense Staff functions were defined in 
Moscow, at the WTO Joint Armed Forces Headquarter, which rarely took into 
consideration national interests and requirements of national authority over the armed 
forces.105 
Besides politically motivated changes, budget constraint also played a role in 
reorganizing the Hungarian Army. Mr. Keleti announced in September 1994, that as a 
cost-saving measure he would reduce the Army's Command size, eliminate intermediate 
command levels and command the military zones to report directly to General Staff.10 
The reform was "to reduce Hungary's four military districts to two and decrease staff, 
and at the same to enhance the ability to react rapidly, make communication faster, and 
create better informed, more independent staff."107 Army Commander, General Jänos 
Deäk supported the minister's proposal; while presenting the reform concept to the 
National Assembly, he noted, "...the program was motivated by the fact that budgetary 
allocation were inadequate to maintain existing military structures and by the need to 
103
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modify the Hungarian Armed Forces for integration with NATO."108 In accordance with 
the 88/1995 National Assembly Resolution on Direction of the "Long and Medium Term 
Reform of the Hungarian Defense and its Personnel Strength"109 the effect of the 
reorganization would be a reduction of 8,400 civilians and 5,400s officers between 1996 
and 1998. Due to the continuing fiscal constrain the Army's size had dropped from 
155,000 to 93,000 by July 1995, and was planned to "...reduce further to 70,000 by the 
end of 1996, ... the reform concept envisioned an army consisting of 60,000 personnel by 
1998, which would comprise 0.5 percent of the Hungary's population."111 
B. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS: AN OBSTACLE TO MODERNIZATION 
In 1990-1995 despite", sometimes bitter, parliamentary political debate, there was 
a consensus among the six parties, represented in the Parliament concerning the 
inevitability of a substantial force reduction. The 88/1995 National Assembly Resolution, 
though it was passed due to the majority of the governing parties in the Parliament, ended 
this consensus. The opposition criticized the reform as "fiscal restrictive and budget 
driven, lacking the element of long term professional conceptual planning."112 Financial 
constraints, however, were really severe. Therefore the Hungarian Government's state 
administration plan required further cuts in government expenses over the following 
113 years. 
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The state administration plan, together with the still high inflation, "led to a 60% 
decrease in defense budget in real terms, while it increased nominally by about 57% in 
1989-1996."114 In GDP terms The Hungarian defense budget amounted to 1.5% and 1.4% 
of the GDP in 1995 and 1996 correspondingly, remaining the lowest among all Central 
European neighbors.115 The overall reducing defense budget left no alternatives for the 
government but to prioritize manpower and operation and maintenance (O&M) at the 
expense of investment, research and development (see Table IV.B.l). This questioned the 
Army's possibilities of complying with NATO standards and questioned "whether 
Hungarian political elite either understands and/or really supports [that] goal »116 
Defense Budget by Function in Hungary in Percentages 
1995-1996 
Year Personnel O&M Procurement R&D Infrastructure 
1995 52 36 8 0 4 
1996 50 35 9 0 6 
Table IV.B.1 117 
Undeniably, this situation was not only unique for Hungary. For historical 
reasons, both Poland and the Czech Republic also encountered similar economic 
constrains, once they were members of the WTO and the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA). Table rV.B.2, shows changes in defense expenditure in Poland and 
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the Czech Republic; while Table IV.B.3, demonstrates defense budget allocation by 
function of these two countries. 
Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP 1992-1995 
1992 1993 1994 1995 
Czech Republic 3.8 2.7 2.7 2.8 
Poland 2.3 2.6 2.4 2.5 
Table IV.B.2 118 
Defense Budget by Function in Percentages 
1995-1996 
Personnel O&M Procurement R&D Infrastructure 
1995 
Czech Republic 35 43 14 4 4 
Poland 63 22 12 2 1 
1996 
Czech Republic 41 26 15 3 16 
Poland 69 15 14 1 1 
Table TV.B.3. 119 
Despite scarce resources, the government decided to initiate improvement in 
military technology in 1998, to be interoperable with NATO forces. On 19 September 
1995 the National Assembly approved two proposals on air defense to improve radars 
118IISS, ADELPHI Paper No. 306 (Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 25. 
119Ibid:p.26. 
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and to procure a low-altitude air defense missile system.120 The US-based contractor, 
Westinghouse won the radar bid, and the US agreed to assist in the modernization of the 
radar system in the framework of PfP, while the French "MATRA" won the low-altitude 
air defense missile system with "MISTRAL" missiles.121 
Aircraft procurement is another important factor shaping the defense budget and 
100 force structure. Although, Hungary in 1993 acquired 28 MiG-29 (Fulcrum) aircraft 
from Russia as to cover part of its debt to Hungary, military and civilian experts agreed to 
procure Western aircrafts to fulfill NATO compatible requirements, because operational 
life-span of the MIGs expires in 2002. Furthermore, the O&M cost and refurbishing 
expenses to make these aircraft interoperable with NATO would require vast resources. 
In December 1995 a tentative decision was made to purchase 30 combat aircraft from 
among Swedish "Grippen", US F-16 or F-18 or French "Mirage".123 The Finance 
Ministry concluded, however, that "no deal could be concluded because the money was 
not available"124 and the government decided to postpone the decision until 1997.125 
The military leadership, though, agreed on force reduction and accepted the 
Parliament decision on a budget cut, and warned politicians, as General Deäk admitted in 
a November 1995 report to Parliament Defense Committee, "that effect of reorganization, 
downsizing, [a] smaller budget and reduced training was having an effect upon morale, 
... the professional staff was particularly critical, ... the officer salary is not in proportion 
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with their responsibility."126 During 1996 General Deäk retired and Lt. General Ferenc 
Vegh, the first Hungarian US Army War College graduate, assumed the position of Army 
Commander/Chief of Staff in May 1996.127 In his testimony to the Parliament Defense 
Committee on 6 June 1996, he noted, "an Army of 45,000 would be enough to defend the 
country, but the 88/1995 Parliamentary Resolution allotted only half of that amount for 
functioning that Army. Therefore, the political decision-makers needed'to decide whether 
they want to have an effective defense force or an operetta army."128 Later he went on by 
indicating frustration with civilian politicians, when he acknowledged that it is unclear 
whether Hungarian politicians understand the need of force modernization and training, 
and added that Hungary would 
probably be unable too answer [NATO's] question on army budget and 
army equipment. ... It is the task of the politicians and financial expert to 
plan and distribute the budget. This means both civilian control and 
civilian responsibility. ... If we cannot increase the material expenses, we 
will not be able to fulfill further NATO requirements. NATO does not 
need untrained soldiers. " 
Only after the 1997 Madrid NATO Summit, where the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
invitation was extended to three countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) to 
begin accession talks with NATO, the Hungarian government made a commitment to 
increase the defense budget annually by 0.1% of the GDP between 1998 and 2001, 
reaching 1.84% of the GDP130, still lower than the average 2.5% NATO defense budget. 
Another important aspect of the committed defense budget increment was the possibility 
to substantially increase military's salaries in the next couple of years. The law stipulated 
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that the military's salary would increase on average 19.6% over two years. Nonetheless, 
due to existing financial constraints, salary correction happened in two steps. Military 
personnel got 80% of its salary guaranteed into law in 1998, and a full 100% of its salary 
in 1999. 
C.    MOUNTING    PUBLIC    AND    POLITICAL    SUPPORT    FOR    NATO 
INTEGRATION 
The will of the government, embodied in the commitment to NATO, to increase 
the defense budget in support of the military had satisfied military personnel and 
politicians. Nevertheless, Hungary faced another problem in civil-military relations prior 
to NATO accession. While the military was generally pro-NATO, for example, 60% 
expressed supporting views in 1994 and around 70% in 1996131, a poll conducted in 1996 
indicated that only 44% of the general population favored NATO enlargement.132 This 
was based on the "neutral sentiment" inherited from the 1 November 1956 speech of Imre 
Nagy133, who proclaimed Hungarian neutrality and its withdrawal from WTO. Results of 
the poll questioned the effectiveness of the government's presentation of its NATO 
policies. Nevertheless, the above figures show an overall trend. 
The military blesses those policies that increase its budget and importance, while 
the general population opposes any extra cost, increasing social spending. Interestingly, 
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but not surprisingly this public view of not appreciating an obligations of the NATO 
membership even was held by those in high positions. The Defense Ministry's Deputy 
State Secretary for Defense Policy noted, "First, we wish to participate in decision- 
making. Second, we expect the defense guarantees included in Article 5 of the 
Washington Agreement will be extended to Hungary."134 To cope with the problem the 
government and Ministry of Defense employed a new Public Relations (PR) strategy. 
In 1996 the MOD established "Euroatlanti Studio" Communication Studio135 to 
help promote euro-atlantic integration, and to organize and conduct public forums, 
exhibitions and customary-celebrated air shows, in which the Hungarian Air Force along 
with the Air Forces of different NATO countries took part. It was important for the 
government to "sell" the idea of euro-atlantic integration, since it would cost a lot of 
taxpayers' money. By a Hungarian assessment, "Hungarian contribution to the direct cost 
of the NATO accession would be 108-144 billion forints (HUF), while cost of the 
transformation of the Army would be 360-484 billion HUF."136 
Eventually, as an early 1997 poll showed, only 34% of the general population 
opposed NATO membership for Hungary. However, despite the rather high popular 
support for NATO membership, "support in favor to send troops to defend another ally 
remained as low as 63%."137 This can be explained by the historical heritage of the 1956 
Hungarian Revolution and the aftermath of the 1968 Czechoslovak invasion. 
When the HPS formed a government in 1994 it promised, after the accession talks 
ended, to solicit the opinion of the populace about NATO membership. To keep its 
134
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promise the government called for a referendum on 16 November 1997. SZDSZ, the 
coalition partner regarded "the NATO membership as a matter of extraordinary 
importance. For this reason it accepted] the referendum [as] binding."138 The referendum 
turned out to be more successful than expected. The turnout was 49.24% and 85.33% of 
the voters said "yes" to the question "Do you agree that the Republic of Hungary should 
guarantee its security by joining NATO?"139 
Another important issue, where political and public support could be achieved 
was military education. Education was a key way to change military and public thinking. 
Already back in 1993, the Parliament passed a Law about Higher Education, but 
implementation of that law was a task of the new government of 1994-1998. According 
to the law, military higher educational facilities were integrated into the Ministry of 
Education.140 Although, educational facilities remained dependent on financial support 
from the ministry of defense, their educational-professional supervision went to civilian 
hands. Furthermore, military colleges and the National Defense University (NDU) began 
to offer courses in security and strategic studies, and civil-military relations not only for 
military personnel but also for civilian and even government employees and members of 
Parliament. This was important for a better understanding between civilian policy-makers 
and the military, since, as Tamäs Wachsler, Defense Committee Deputy Chairman noted, 
"unless MPs [members of the Parliament] ask the correct question, they will not get the 
[right] answer [from the military] they are looking for."141 
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On the other hand, according to the law, civilian universities also began to provide 
courses for military personnel in every aspect of science and social studies.142 Amplifying 
the effect of military educational reform, from the 1995 academic year on: female 
students were eligible to attend military colleges and university. With such an opening for 
the female part of the population the military also gained additional public support. 
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V.     INSIDE NATO, IN THE WAR AND THE AFTERMATH FOR 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (1998-2000) 
The period between 1998 and 2000 was very intensive and demanding for 
Hungarian civil-military relations. The new government, which entered into power in the 
summer of 1998, inherited the ongoing accession talks with NATO. As a result of 
complying with minimum requirements143 for NATO membership, on 12 March 1999 
Hungary became a full-member of NATO. On 24 March 1999, NATO began the Kosovo 
War, in which Hungary participated by providing airfields, airspace and Host Nation 
Support (HNS) to NATO troops. The war highlighted deficiencies in the Hungarian 
Armed Forces, particularly the Air Force144, and accelerated the modernization process. 
This modernization, which includes drastic force reduction, base-closure, and the 
acquisition of new military technology, required strong political and public support, since 
force reduction affects the social-political environment and the procurement process 
needs domestic political-party support. 
A. CHANGES IN POWER AND ESTABLISHING LEGAL BASIS FOR JOINING 
NATO 
In the summer of 1998, after the third multi-party election, a new government - a 
coalition of the FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party (FIDESZ-MPP) and the Independent 
Smallholders' Party (FKGP) - entered into power. According to the coalition agreement, 
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the FKGP had a right to nominate ministers of defense, agriculture and environment. 
Thus, after the FKGP nomination, the new Prime Minister, Viktor Orbän (FIDESZ-MPP) 
appointed Dr. Jänos Szabo, a lawyer, as minister of defense. Mr. Szabö had experience 
neither in military matters nor in state administration, but in the Parliament Defense 
Committee he testified, "...I prepared for this position for one week from articles and 
military alumni journals."145 
The new defense minister began his work, as it had been done during the last ten 
years. He changed the personnel in key ministerial positions, practically down to the 
deputy state secretary level, with the exception of Istvän Gyarmati, the Deputy State 
Secretary for Defense Policy (see Appendix V.A.I).147 The appointment of the new 
leadership of the MOD demonstrates the notable dynamics of domestic politics. Despite 
the intention of the new government to replace the previous establishment, they granted a 
position to Mr. Gyarmati, who in 1996 declared to assume the position until Hungary's 
NATO accession, since he was the only person in a high position, who had any 
knowledge of NATO in the new MOD. 
Another interesting appointment was Tamäs Waschler as administrative state 
secretary. His appointment went against the request of the smaller coalition partner to 
establish a "clear FKGP ministry" and, more importantly, it was unexpected, since Mr. 
Waschler left the FIDESZ in 1994, after his defeat for the party-presidency of the 
FIDESZ.148 
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The new government and defense ministry's leadership had priceless advantages 
in comparison with the previous ones. They had political support of the parliamentary 
parties, since "...all parliamentary parties have emphasized the need for NATO 
membership, not because of perceived threat, but because the euro-atlantic integration 
offers the best conditions for security, stability and modernization."149 On the other hand, 
the result of the referendum, regarding Hungary's NATO membership, held on 17 
November 1997, showed that a majority of public support for NATO.150 Thus, under such 
fortunate circumstances the new government could focus on creating essential new laws 
and amending existing ones for NATO accession and complying with minimum Target 
Force Goals (TFG) requirements. 
The most important amendment to the Constitution, is the one that governs use 
and deployment of force, since with joining NATO, Article 5 mission could have 
required sending Hungarian troops abroad. The then existing Constitution stipulated, 
"Only Parliament is entitled to make decision concerning the use of the Armed 
Forces."151 The government wanted to amend the Constitution so that the government 
would have the right to decide on deployment of the Hungarian military in a NATO 
context. Since the amendment to the Constitution requires two-third majority support of 
the Parliament, the governing coalition needed support of the opposition parties as well. 
In that period of time, the governing parties suffered a setback based on the domestic 
political struggle. 
By the parliamentary "house" regulation, each parliamentary party can originate a 
parliamentary inspection committee, providing 75 members of the Parliament support the 
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idea,152 Thus, in November 1998 the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Alliance 
of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) initiated the establishment of an inspection committee 
dealing with the "nomination practice of governing parties".153 Although the governing 
parties had not rejected the opposition request to establish an inspection committee, their 
majority in the House changed the scope of the committee, making it irrelevant.154 That 
degradation of the opposition's request resulted in the withdrawal of their support from 
the effort to amend the Constitution. The opposition parties stated that they did not 
support extending the right of the government, while the government was cutting back 
their rights.155 In the assessment of Pal Dunay, director of Center for Security Studies, the 
amendment would have helped in coordinating joint action with NATO, however this 
was not an accession criteria.156 
Interestingly enough, the opposition parties supported both the 1998/LXXXV 
Law on "National Security Authority" and the amendment to the 1993/CX Defense Law. 
The 1998/LXXXV Law sets forth provision to support NATO and Western European 
Union (WEU) Security Manual implementation in Hungary.157 According to the law, the 
"Authority" supervises implementation laws on classified information in accordance with 
NATO and the WEU Security Manual.158 The 1998/LXXXIX Law on National Defense 
implemented expression of "allied forces" and "allied states" into Hungarian laws. The 
amendment to the 1993/CX Law states, "The Republic of Hungary basically relies on its 
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own national economy, national defense forces in defending the integrity of Hungary, and 
ultimately on allied states and allied forces in sustaining individual and collective defense 
capability."159 The new law defines additional roles of the Hungarian Armed Forces as, 
"...meet military obligations originated in international treaties, especially with North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nation and Organization of Security Cooperation in 
Europe."160 Thus opposition parties such as MSZP and SZDSZ, that were previously 
governing parties, sustained their commitment to NATO and supported the adaptation of 
laws, necessary to NATO accession. 
During the accession talks, Hungary committed itself to meet 48 so-called TFGs 
within 7 years, 14 of which would be met by the day of accession.161 Though information 
on TFG are mostly classified, they contain, among others, congestion-free 
communication network, integrated air defense, units under NATO command and 
information security. 
In early 1998 the Ministry of Defense announced a tender for 
tele(phone)communication network, in which the German "Siemens", US "Lucent", 
French "Alcatel", Austrian "Kapsch" and Swedish "Ericsson" companies participated. 
After long - political and professional - debates, Dr. Szabo, Minister of Defense, despite 
Parliamentary Defense Committee advice that both Siemens' and Lucent's bids met the 
tender's criteria, qualifying both of them as possible [shared] builder of the military 
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communication network162, declared Siemens, as the winner of the 20-billion worth 
bid.163 
Hungary's joining of the integrated air defense system is important both for 
Hungary and NATO, since Hungary does not have common border with any of the 
NATO countries. Therefore, NATO can provide a guarantee according to Article 5 
mission only by air. Thus, authorized by the National Assembly resolution in 1995164, 
Hungary began to build an Air Sovereignty Operation Center in 1998, which had to be 
finished by February 1999.165 As for as Hungarian units under NATO command are 
concerned, Hungary offered the Szolnok Rapid Reaction Battalion and the 25th Tata 
Mechanized Infantry Brigade to NATO command.166 
As a result of changing security environment, the closing accession talks in 
which Hungary was to become a member of the Euro-Atlantic security community, the 
government initiated an amendment to the Basic Security Principles adopted in 1993. 
With the full support of the parliamentary political parties the National Assembly passed 
a resolution on Basic Security Principles of the Republic of Hungary on 29 December 
1998. The resolution states 
In recent years there have been substantial changes in Hungary's security 
environment. By becoming a member of NATO, Hungary institutionally 
also becomes a member of a community of developed, democratic and 
stabile countries. Thus, there is a need to reformulate Basic Security 
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The resolution restates that Hungary does not have a perceived enemy, all 
players,who follow basic principles of international law, are considered partners by 
Hungary, and it is committed to settling dispute according to international law and 
European practice.168 As a new principle though, the resolution stipulates: 
Hungary sustains its security most effectively as a member of North 
Atlantic Treaty on the basis of collective security. As a member of NATO, 
Hungary has committed itself to sharing the burden of collective defense. 
Hungary sees the Allies' consultative mechanism as a tool of enhancing 
security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and articulating national 
interests. Trans-Atlantic cooperation is a basic factor in European stability 
and security for a long-run. 
B. IN THE KOSOVO WAR 
On 9 February 1999, the Parliament with overwhelming majority vote (330 "yes, 
13 "no" and 1 absentee) passed a law ratifying Hungary's membership to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, dated 4 April 1949.170 Hungary, after depositing its 
instrument of accession with the Government of the United States, legally became a 
member of NATO on 12 March 1999. 
After only two weeks of a honeymoon with NATO and after the unsuccessful 
mission of Richard Holbrooke to persuade Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milisevic to 
accept the US-initiated peace agreement, NATO opened an air-war against Hungary's 
neighbor Yugoslavia on 24 March 1999.171 The Hungarian government and public were 
caught off guard by the immediate war; although; nobody discounted such a course of 
168
 94/1998 OGY Hatarozat. Article 5, (Budapest: 29 December 1999). 
169
 94/1998 OGY Hatärozat. Article 7, (Budapest: 29 December 1999). 
170
 1999/1 Torvenv. l.§ (Budapest: 9 February, 1999). The Hungarian Life and Truth Party (MIEP), based 
171 
on heritage of 1956 uprising voted „no" and argued for position of neutrality. 
"NATO legicsapäs Jugoszläviära," Nepszabadsäg Online. (Budapest: 24 March 1999). 
53 
action. The NATO's request to provide indefinite use of Hungarian airspace, airfield and 
logistic facilities in supporting the Kosovo mission arrived to the Hungarian government 
on 23 March 1999 at 2100 hours.172 On the next day, during a parliamentary session, the 
National   Assembly   passed   a  resolution   supporting  NATO's   request.   Since   the 
Constitution gives the Parliament the right to authorize the crossing of the Hungarian 
border by any foreign military personnel and means, the resolution needed two-third 
majority vote.173 The resolution stipulates 
According to the Constitution 40. § (1) the National Assembly authorizes 
combat, transport, surveillance aircrafts and helicopters, participating in 
NATO's Kosovo mission to implement UN resolutions regarding the 
Kosovo crisis, to use Hungary's airspace, airfields, air-control and logistic 
facilities without restriction during the time of the mission.174 
The government and opposition parties in assuring the Hungarian population about the 
role of NATO aircraft in Hungary stated, "The role of NATO aircrafts is mostly to defend 
the Hungarian airspace."175 The government, furthermore, ruled out Hungary's direct 
involvement in military actions and pressed NATO and Milosevic to avoid military 
action in Vojvodina due to 300,000 Hungarian minorities living there.176 Hungary's fear 
of NATO military action in Vojvodina was not baseless, since in Vojvodina, Yugoslavia 
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The war in Kosovo immediately highlighted deficiencies in Hungary's policy- 
making and military capability, particularly in the air force. In such a situation, where 
rapid decision-making is necessary, the consultative mechanism, based on the consensus 
of the parliamentary parties proved to be insufficient; therefore the government justified 
its desire to exclusively be in a decisive position regarding use of force. Whereas, in the 
domestic political arena, where parties build up policy on confrontation, which is the case 
in Hungary, neither the governing coalition nor the opposition parties support extension 
of rights and power of others.178 Due to this, MSZP requested the government to press 
NATO not to conduct air strikes from Hungarian air bases, arguing that the 20/1999 
National Assembly Resolution did not authorize such actions.179 MSZP articulated, that 
air strikes  from  Hungarian  territory could initiate Yugoslavian retaliation  against 
Hungarian minorities in Vojvodina causing a massive influx of refugees to Hungary. 
However, governing parties, backed up with the other opposition party, SZDSZ, rejected 
the proposal, and Prime Minister Orbän warned MSZP "...not to use a military situation 
in Yugoslavia in domestic political agenda."180 
Another issue, where parliamentary parties expressed different views, was the 
status of Vojvodina. On 28 April 1999, when Istvän Csurka, leader of quasi-opposition 
parliamentary party, MEBP, expressed his opinion on border revision with Yugoslavia 
and joining a part of Vojvodina to Hungary, the opposition parties angrily rejected the 
idea,  while  the  government indicated only,  "...that such  an  option  was  not  on 
' Opposition parties, namely the MSZP and SZDSZ opposed extending the government rights to allow 
foreign military to enter/station in Hungary's territory. The opposition condemed the government for 
cutting back oversight and decisive role of Parliament, while the government was willing to extend its 
rights on use of the military. 




government's agenda now."m Interestingly enough, on 10 May 1999, when Zsolt Länyi 
(FKGP), chairman of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, proposed the idea of 
independent state status for Vojvodina,182 the prime minister backed off, stating, "This is 
only Mr. Länyi's personal opinion."183 The prime minister did not pay any attention to 
this particular detail, which Mr. Länyi had expressed as a chairperson of a parliamentary 
committee and as a member of a coalition party. 
As for as military capabilities are concerned, Hungary did not participated with 
military means in the Kosovo War. Since NATO mostly used its overwhelming air might, 
the Hungarian air force, due to its deficient control and communication capability could 
not participate in direct action. Moreover, the government indicated, "By the 
parliamentary resolution, the Hungarian military will not participate in military action in 
Kosovo, nor will a Hungarian soldier leave the territory of Hungary."184 In addition, the 
possibilities of the Hungarian Air Force to join the war were reduced as well. Despite the 
functioning Air Sovereignty Operation Center in Veszprem, on 9 April 1999, NATO air- 
traffic control took over half of the Hungarian airspace, closing it between 4,500 and 
12,000 meters (see Fig. V.B.I) for flights. Although Hungarian aircrafts were mounted 
with NATO Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment, they were usable only in a 
peace-time mission. Until the beginning of the air campaign Hungary had not acquired 
the so-called "war code" for IFF, without which Hungarian aircrafts could be identified 
only as enemy airplanes on NATO air control screen. Hungarian MiG-29s could only fly 
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within the boundary of Hungary with prior permission of the NATO air control center, 
located in Vincenza, Italy.185 
186 Figure V.B.I.     NATO Controlled Airspace in Hungary During the Kosovo War 
Regardless of support of the parliamentary parties, the government was concerned 
about public reaction to war in Kosovo. Nevertheless, a public opinion poll, conducted on 
11-12 April 1999, showed the majority of the public supported the air campaign, but 
expressed doubt of its outcome. At the beginning of the air strikes 23 percent of the 
population thought that the aim of the war was to stop ethnic-cleaning and help 
minorities, while on the date of the poll this number increased to 48 percent. About two- 
third of those questioned supported the idea of helping refugees regardless of their 
national origin, and about half said they would accommodate refugees in their homes. 
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However, half of those questioned would only accommodate refugees, if "somebody else 
paid the bill". The number of NATO supporters increased as well with 57 percent 
supporting NATO membership in March 1999. By April this number increased to 66 
percent. According to the poll 60 percent of the population believed that if an armed 
attack occurred against Hungary, NATO would help.187 
The lessons learned from the Kosovo War forced the Hungarian government to seek 
a more consolidated decision-making process and to accelerate the implementation of 
force modernization, which was envisioned in the Basic Security Principles adopted in 
late 1998. 
C.    THE    EFFECT    OF    DOMESTIC    POLITICS    ON    CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS AFTER KOSOVO 
After the Kosovo War the government initiated a so-called strategic defense 
review. The review envisioned a ten-year long, three-phase defense reform, which would 
include steps of restructuring the armed forces, simplifying the command and control 
strata, modernizing training and military technology, and improving work and living 
conditions of military personnel. Even though each involved party agreed to the 
necessity of the reforms, these programs did not happen without problems. 
Back in February 1999, Istvan Gyarmati, Deputy State Secretary for Defense 
Policy, was relieved from his position, allegedly because he falsified the Defense 
Planning Questionary (DPQ), sent to Brussels, and promised non-existing Hungarian 
187
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military capabilities to NATO.189 To replace Mr. Gyarmaty, minister of defense 
appointed LtG. Lajos Fodor as Deputy State Secretary. This step was controversial 
though, because it contradicted the government's intention of enhancing civilian control. 
Although, LtG. Fodor would act as a civilian in his new position, he previously occupied 
position of Deputy Chief of Defense Staff. Therefore despite his good intentions, his 
impartiality would be questioned. 
In the defense review, another clashing point was Mr. Wachsler's, administrative 
state secretary, proposal concerning the relation between the Commander of the 
Hungarian Army/Chief of Staff and civilian leadership of the ministry of defense. In Mr. 
Wachsler view, in the integrated ministry of defense the Commander of the Hungarian 
Army/Chief of Staff would be under his chain of command.190 The basis of the 
confrontation was the traditional question, "Who commands whom?" In Hungary the 
Chief of Staff still had a right to give orders, which was in conflict with NATO practice, 
according to Mr. Wachsler.191 As expected, Gen. Vegh, Commander of the Army, 
opposed the notion, which, in fact restricted his authority and responsibility. Moreover, 
Gen. Vegh worked out his concept of the integration, in which he proposed the position 
of the Chief of Staff and Administrative State Secretary to be equal in terms of authority 
and responsibility. Gen. Vegh sent the idea directly to the President (Commander in 
Chief), his superior by the Constitution. However, Dr. Szabö, Defense Minister, and Mr. 
Wachsler clearly felt that Gen. Vegh violated their chain of command.192 The prime 
minister backed up his minister, supporting a more centralized idea of integration and 
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saying,   "The   Commander's   overreaching   authority   prevents   exercising   civilian 
,193 
control."     Thus, Gen. Vegh, sensing loss of political support, submitted his resignation 
on 9 July 1999.194 
By nomination of the minister, the president appointed LtG. Lajos Fodor, who, 
just half a year ago, was appointed to the position of Deputy State Secretary for Defense 
Policy, as Commander of the Hungarian Army/Chief of Staff on 1 August 1999.195 The 
appointment of LtG. Fodor met full support of all parliamentary parties in the Parliament 
Defense Committee, where Gen. Fodor said "I will put all my effort to programs, 
envisioned in the Strategic Defense Review, to succeed, in improving the living and work 
conditions in the military. I accept the superiority of politics, where the Commander gets 
his orders from the minister, who represents the government's policy."196 
Implementation of the defense reform, however, was halted for the rest of 1999, 
due to the different interpretation of the Constitution by parliamentary parties. The 
defense reform concept, particularly the part on the use of force and sending Hungarian 
troops abroad, required amendment to the Constitution. The Socialist Party sustained its 
position, according, which only the Parliament is entitled, with an aggravated majority 
vote, permitting the participation of Hungarian troops in peacekeeping, peace-building 
mission. At the same time the proposition would grant rights to the government to decide 
and permit movement of troops in connection with NATO/PfP exercises.197 The 
Parliamentary Defense Committee chairman, Mr. Länyi half-opposed and half-supported 
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the Socialist's idea saying, "It is my opinion that the Parliament should decide on 
participation in peacekeeping missions, not with aggravated but simple majority vote." 
Meanwhile, despite a standoff between the coalition and opposition parties, in 
October 1999 the prime minister's office worked out a proposal, aimed at creating more 
centralized Defense Forces. According to plans, small bases, military storages in remote 
places would close. The Hungarian Defense Forces would get rid of institutions, which 
were not in accordance with basic tasks of the military. Such institutions are military 
health and recreational facilities, cultural institutions and the National Defense 
University.199 Yet, since these plans affect the manning level of the military, their 
implementation requires National Assembly's majority approval, which was, due to the 
chilly relations between governing and opposition parties, unlikely. 
The rhetoric used by parties did not help to ease the tension between the 
opposition, MSZP, and the governing FIDESZ-MPP. FIDESZ speakers often accused the 
MSZP of causing more harm to Hungary's economy, military and social affairs, than 
"natural disasters". On the other hand the MSZP charged the coalition government with 
splitting up the society, creating cliques, and unaccountable spending of money without 
public accountability. 
To comply with the government proposal, by March 2000, Dr. Szabo, Defense 
Minister and Mr. Wachsler, Administrative State Secretary worked out a new defense 
reform concept, which included the closure of 73 military bases, reduction of about 
20,000 personnel, and the integration the MOD and the Defense Staff.200 After amending 
the Defense Law, the concept envisioned,"...abolishment of the position of Commander 
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of the Hungarian Army, delegating the Commander's rights to the minister of defense; 
however, the minister of defense could delegate organizational rights and responsibilities, 
requiring professional-military capabilities, to the Chief of Staff."201 Yet, to amend the 
Defense Law would require opposition support in the Parliament, which due to new 
clashes caused by the election of the media's board of trustees, was unlikely. 
The government, to break the deadlock, implemented a new public relation's (PR) 
strategy. First, Prime Minister Orbän announced that he would personally supervise the 
defense reform,203 which was a move itself to evaluate defense matters in the eyes of the 
public. Secondly, the Prime Minister appointed Bela Kiräly, a former general in the 1956 
upheaval, as a personal adviser in implementing defense reform.204 Thirdly, the prime 
minister appealed to the opposition parties by stating that national defense was a matter 
of extraordinary importance, therefore, it needed consensus of the parties. Since 
opposition parties based their tactics on national interest, any further objection to 
cooperation in defense matters would question their real devotion to national defense, 
force modernization and, eventually, to NATO, and, as a consequence, would lead to loss 
of public support. 
The new PR turned out to be success. In March 2000, after four rounds of 
negotiations of the six parliamentary parties, a pre-agreement was reached about the steps 
of the defense reform.205 The pre-agreement reached during negotiations continued in the 
201




 "Honvedseg es nyilvänossäg," HVG. 2000/17, (Budapest: 29 April, 2000), p. 58. 
204
 "Haderöreform-kerdöjelek," HVG. 2000/10, (Budapest: 11 March 2000), pp. 107-109. Appointment 
of Mr. Kiräly may be seen as a continuation of 1956 liberal ideas in the government policy, moreover, 
Mr. Kiräly has been a devoted proponent of the defense reform, integrated ministry of defense and 
civilian control since 1990. (see also: Kiräly, Bela, "Military Reform: What Should Be Done," 
Nepszabadsäg. 13 April, 1991). 
205
 "Hatpärti megegyezes a haderöreformröl," Nepszabadsäg. (Budapest: 19 March 2000). 
62 
Parliamentary session on 21  June 2000, where the National Assembly adopted a 
resolution on "The principles of the reorganization of the Hungarian Defense Forces"." 
The resolution stipulates that the reorganization 
...should cover all aspect of the military, including the structure of the 
Defense Forces, command and control strata, system of readiness, 
mobilization and training, military technology modernization, defense 
planning and spending, ratio of personnel, work and living condition of 
personnel, social and other benefits, public relation of the Hungarian 
207 Defense Forces and human resource management. 
The resolution states, "Command and control of the Hungarian Defense Forces should be 
accomplished by integration of the Defense Staff into the Ministry of Defense by the end 
of 2000."208 Six-party consensus gave the government a quasi-free hand in the 
implementation of the defense reform, which hoped to expediate the decision-making 
process. By the resolution, the National Assembly "Authorizes the government, in 
implementation of the 61/2000 Resolution, to work out detailed programs and plans, 
including a concept for dealing with the consequences of personnel reduction, and, after 
conciliation with the parliamentary Defense Committee, to give out directives on 
implementation."209 
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D. CONTROVERSIES IN DEFENSE REFORM 
The Resolution, which was based on Mr. Wachsler's, the Administrative State 
Secretary, Defense Concept had immediate personnel and economic consequences. The 
Resolution brought bad luck to its "father", because contrary to Mr. Wachsler's plans the 
National Assembly put the position of the Chief of Staff at an equal level with the 
Administrative Secretary.210 Unsuccessful in his plans to direct the Ministry of Defense, 
Mr. Wachsler resigned on 15 September 2000.211 For some opposition observers, Mr. 
Wachsler presence in the MOD served only to enhance the economic (monetary) 
condition of the governing parties, since his plans made the Army's 800 billions real- 
estate assets become property of the State Privatization Company (ÄPV Rt.), which was 
run by the government.2'2 
After resignation of Mr. Wachsler, the minister of defense appointed Col. Tamäs 
Perenyei, previously Head of the Infrastructure Department of MOD, as Administrative 
State Secretary of MOD on 1 October 2000.213 Next, after a heated debate over the 
appointment of generals, on 1 December 2000 the minister of defense replaced Prof. 
Jänos Szabo with MG. Tivadar Farkas (ret.) in the position of Deputy State Secretary for 
Human Affairs.214 
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Authorized by the 61/2000 National Assembly Resolution, in August 2000, the 
Defense minister began to plan the reorganization of the higher echelon of the Hungarian 
Armed Forces, which included repositioning assignments of generals. Agreeing with the 
Chief of Staff, the defense minister submitted his list of proposals in September 2000 to 
the Commander in Chief, the President, for approval, but the Prime Minister killed the 
nomination list, saying: "...it needs to be revised because what we need is a young, loyal 
to the Defense Forces and NATO oriented general corps."215 By this move the Prime 
Minister clearly violated his constitutional rights, since according to the Defense Law and 
the Constitution "The president appoints generals by the nomination of the minister of 
defense."216 The Prime Minister's disagreement caused an "ex lex" situation lasting until 
the end of October 2000. The basis of the "ex lex" situation was that generals, who 
accepted the new positions, were relieved from previous assignments, but the Prime 
Minister's intervention prevented their assignment from taking place. The Prime Minister 
defended his position saying, "Since Hungary is a parliamentary democracy where all 
responsibility for government action lays with the Prime Minister, I personally think it is 
my responsibility to re-examine generals' appointments."217 
Besides the appointment of the generals the government and MOD's leadership 
continued to "slenderize" the armed forces. The MOD proposed the closure of 73 military 
bases, among those Papa Airfield and the Danube Flotilla by the end of 2002.218 
proposition of Col. Perenyei, the defefense minister replaced Mr. Martinusz in the position of Deputy 
State Secretary  for Defense Policy  with MG. Jözsef Bali  on   1  March 2001.  (see:  "Katonai 
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Interestingly enough, not only the members of the opposition parties, but also governing 
parties questioned the reality and effectiveness of these base closures. Läszlö Köver, the 
governing party's president questioned the defense minister in the Parliament on 31 
August 2000, "Why does the Chief of Staff hinder defense reform."219 Mr. Köver was 
referring to Papa Airfield soon after Gen. Fodor,  Chief of Staff announced the 
government's decision. Mr. Köver apparently was unaware of the government's decision; 
moreover, his interpellation was based on his local-patriotism, since he is a parliamentary 
delegate of Papa. The same story happened to the Danube Flotilla, only this time the 
opponent was Mr. Länyi, chairman of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, who, on the 
same 31 August, questioned his fellow party-member, the defense minister, about the 
economic rationality of the Flotilla closure.220 Of coincidence, Mr. Länyi had been 
elected to the Parliament from Üjpest district of Budapest, where the Flotilla was located. 
Besides the obvious politically motivated lobbying, the mayors of the settlements, 
where bases scheduled for closure were located, also began to lobby for tangible 
economic reasons. Any base closure directly affects the environment of the military. It is 
likely that an indefinite number of professional soldiers will not accept assignment to a 
new location, causing unemployment in specific regions. Additionally, with base closure, 
habits of consumers may also change, affecting the regions', cities', villages' budget due 
to changing tax, and discharged personnel may become destitute, which, in terms, may 
cause societal conflicts.221 Prof. Jänos Szabö, Deputy State Secretary for Human Affairs 
warned, "If politicians did not devote resources for keeping personnel in the military 
corps or compensate those of discharged, the ministry of defense would face an 
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embarrassing surprise."222 He meant, and the Military Trade Union affirmed that, more 
personnel would leave the military than the ministry planned. Non-commissioned 
officers, particularly, indicated they would not accept a new assignment and would leave 
the armed forces, pushing the personnel ratio in an unwanted direction.223 
The development of military technology, particularly air force modernization 
caused broad political debate. Considering the 61/2000 National Assembly Resolution, 
but without the Prime Minister consent, the defense minister signed a letter of intend with 
the German DAS A/Russian MAPO consortium on refurbishing 14 Hungarian MiG-29 for 
20 billion Hungarian forints (HUF), to comply with NATO standards.224 Immediately 
after the letter's existence became known, Peter Tufo, the US Ambassador to Hungary, 
stressed that refurbishment of MiGs was a waste of money and advocated the Hungarian 
government to buy used F-16s from the US.225 Government speakers supported Western 
aircraft, stating that the MiGs could not effectively be refurbished; moreover, it was 
essential to get rid of dependency on Russian military technology. Opposition leaders 
indicated that Hungarian economy was not in a condition to spend 160 billion on force 
modernization.""'  Force modernization affects the structure of the defense forces, since 
222
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223
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224
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the operation of more complicated military technology requires more skilled personnel. 
One way to achieve more skilled personnel was the proposition of converting the Armed 
Forces to a voluntary army, envisioned in the 61/2000 National Assembly Resolution.227 
However, there has been a significant difference between the parliamentary 
parties on the implementation of an all-voluntary army. The SZDSZ, an opposition party 
advocates the abolishment of conscription by 2002.228 Governing parties reminded Imre 
Mecs, the strongest proponent of an all-volunteer army, what he said in 1994, "Whenever 
the Conscription is inconvenient, it means a kind of civilian control of the army." The 
MSZP, the other opposition party thinks that because of budgetary constrain an all- 
voluntary force can be implemented within 6-8 years. By the estimate of MSZP's experts, 
immediate conversion would require much more budgetary fund, than is available. In 
the period of NATO membership, initiated base closure, force reorganization and force 
reduction, however, the government cannot avoid dealing with such an issue, which 
directly affects almost all Hungarian families. In the opinion of the coalition parties, the 
creation of an all-volunteer army can be accomplished in an 8-12 year time-period. In the 
MOD's defense concept, however, there is only a provision to reduce conscript time 
from 9 months to 6 months by 2002.231 
after the two-year state budget for 2001-2002 had been passed, there was no mention for aircrafts. (see: 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In summary, Hungary has come a long way since 1989. The October 1989 
Constitution and the 1 December 1989 Defense Reform Concept provided a base for a 
legal framework to reform civil-military relations. The December 1993 Defense Act232 
reassured the Parliament's decisive role in defense matters stating that the Parliament 
plays a primary role in defining the priorities of defense policy. The National Assembly 
decides the defense budget, the manning level of the armed forces, the balance between 
services and the main direction of the development of military technology. The Act made 
the armed forces directly subordinate to the MOD, which has administrative 
responsibilities over the armed forces, and, at the same time, it strengthened the 
constitutional position of the President, as Commander-in-Chef, in the event of 
emergency. 
The Parliament, though, and particularly the Parliamentary Defense Committee, 
could have been more effective. Its limitation was seen in Mr. Keleti's 1995 unilateral 
action to buy T-72 tanks from Belarus, and in 1996, in the participation of MiG-29s in 
PfP exercise in Poland without proper consultation and Parliamentary permission. More 
recently, in 2000 the Defense Committee was not involved in the decision about the air 
force modernization process; however, it imposed a burden on the defense budget. 
Although the 61/2000 National Assembly Resolution has made clear objectives for 
defense reform, Hungary needs more tangible cooperation between the government, the 
Parliament and the integrating Ministry of Defense for the process to be success. 
232
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The 1993/CX Defense Act and the 61/2000 National Assembly Resolution 
defined a long-term defense reform, which includes steps for restructuring the armed 
forces, simplifying the command and control strata, modernizing of training and military 
technology, and improving of work and living conditions of military personnel233 for the 
period of 2000-2010. What Hungary needs to do to implement this important reform is to 
overcome the domestic political standoff caused by different interpretations of the 
Constitution on the use and deployment of the armed forces. 
The integrated Ministry of Defense eliminates duplications caused by conflicting 
tasks of both the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Staff. Defense minister's 
involvement into the direct command structure facilitates the flow of defense needs from 
the armed forces to the government, and by doing so it exposes defense policy and its 
activities to public scrutiny and accountability, making it more efficient and providing a 
more effective oversight of the Hungarian Defense Forces. 
When the Hungarian government, during the period of 1994-1998, realized that 
Hungarian membership in NATO required more than words and devoted itself to increase 
the previously "tiny" defense budget, the new government, taking power in 1998 also 
realized the need for a more comprehensive defense reform. As a direct consequence of 
the Kosovo War the government had to expediate the reforms. The direct involvment of 
the government and personally the prime minister, into the direction, supervision and the 
implementation of the defense reform elevated the importance of national defense. 
The Strategic Defense Review creates a solid background for achieving a smaller, 
better trained, equipped and sustainable, by the domestic economy defense, forces, 




obligations originated in international treaties, especially with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, the United Nation and the Organization of Security Cooperation in 
Europe."234 
At the end of the first step of the defense reform, by 2003, the Hungarian Defense 
Forces will reach their peace-manning level of 39,000. Most of the devoted defense 
budget goes to the improvement of living and work conditions, and the reconstruction of 
remaining military installations. Resource savings from the reduced manning level and 
the privatization of closed bases goes for programs created for compensation and the 
retraining of those discharged. 
In the second phase between 2003-2006, while the MOD is continuing to 
implement "life-style enhancing" programs, the Defense Forces goes on the increment of 
the readiness and training level in order to create a capability based armed forces, 
complying to NATO requirements. During the same period of time, the conscript level of 
the army is decreasing, while a number of contract soldier increases, creating a base for 
an all-voluntary armed forces. 
In the period of 2007-2010, the military and the government will focus on force 
modernization. About one-third of the defense budget will go to procurement of new 
military technology. Defense forces continue to convert into an all-voluntary army and to 
create a healthy ratio of commissioned and non commissioned officers of one to two. 
Since political and public support for sustaining a capable army exists, there is no 
doubt that the army is eventually converting to one that governments of the period of 
1990-2000 envisioned. Then, critiques, such as Istvän Gyarmati, former Deputy State 
Secretary for Defense Policy, who said, "We [in the ministry of defense] do not know 
234
 1998/LXXXIXLaw. Article I, 5.§ (1) (e), (Budapest: 22 December 1998). 
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what to do with the army because the political elite has never decided what it needs the 
army for."235 or Jeffrey Simon, who doubted that "Budapest will actually contribute to 
common defense efforts and, therefore, as a result of insufficient defense resources will 
only be a free-rider in NATO"236, will be outdated. 
235
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236 
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Central and East Europe 
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
Alliance of Young Democrats 
FIDESZ Hungarian Civic Party 
Independent Smallholders' Party 
Gross Domestic Product 
Hungarian Army 
Hungarian People's Army's 
Hungarian Socialist Party 
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party 
Hungarian Forint 
Hungarian Democratic Forum 
Hungarian Life and Truth Party 
Ministry of Defense 
Main Political Directorate 
Hungarian Socialist Party 
North Atlantic Council 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Operation and Maintenance 
Partnership for Peace 
Public Relation 
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SZDSZ Alliance of Free Democrats 
TFG Target Force Goals 
WEU Western European Union 
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